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Abstract
More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience–as suggested by
backward induction–remains inconclusive. This paper provides a meta-analysis of prior
experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how coop-
eration varies with the environment in this canonical game. We describe forces that a↵ect
initial play (formation of cooperation) and unraveling (breakdown of cooperation). First,
contrary to the backward induction prediction, the parameters of the repeated game have
a significant e↵ect on initial cooperation. We identify how these parameters impact the
value of cooperation–as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of Always Defect–to
account for an important part of this e↵ect. Second, despite these initial di↵erences, the
evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all
parameter combinations. Importantly, despite the seemingly contradictory results across
studies, this paper establishes a systematic pattern of behavior: subjects converge to use
threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round; and conditional
on establishing cooperation, the first defection round moves earlier with experience. Sim-
ulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide
insights into the long-term dynamics and the forces that slow down the unraveling of
cooperation. JEL Codes: C72, C73, C92.
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I. Introduction
The prisoner’s dilemma (henceforth PD) is one of the most extensively studied games
in the social sciences. The reason is that the tension at the center of the game–the conflict
between what is socially e cient and individually optimal–underlies many interesting
interactions, economic and otherwise.1 Played once, standard equilibrium notions predict
the Pareto-dominated, uncooperative outcome. Repeating the game does little to improve
the theoretical outlook whenever there is a commonly-known last round; the demands of
subgame perfection, where threats to punish uncooperative play must be credible to have
bite, result in the unraveling of cooperation via backward induction.
In this paper, we experimentally study the finitely repeated PD to understand the fac-
tors that a↵ect (1) the emergence of cooperative behavior; and (2) its possible unraveling
with experience. Our results indicate that cooperative behavior in this canonical environ-
ment is driven by two behavioral regularities: the role of the value of cooperation and the
emergence of threshold strategies. First, we identify a simple-to-compute statistic that
captures initial cooperativeness in this game. The statistic neatly summarizes how the
parameters of the environment a↵ect the key strategic tension in the game. Importantly,
the statistic highlights the role of strategic uncertainty in determining cooperative behav-
ior, and provides a simple measure to assess its impact in di↵erent environments. Second,
we find evidence for a previously unidentified regularity in learning about strategies. Our
results indicate that people learn to use strategies that allow for conditional cooperation
early on (creating dynamic game incentives), but switch to defection later (accounting
for unraveling). With experience, the defection region grows; and the structure of these
strategies provides a backdrop for how backward induction prevails in finitely repeated
games. However, it can take time for the full consequences of these strategies to emerge.
Despite more than half a century of research since the first experiment on the PD
(Flood 1952), it is di cult to answer whether people learn to cooperate or defect in this
game. That is, data from di↵erent studies give a seemingly contradictory picture of the
evolution of play with experience.2 Despite the multitude of papers with data on the game,
several of which test alternative theories consistent with cooperative behavior, it is still
di cult to draw clear conclusions on whether or not subjects in this canonical environment
are learning the underlying strategic force identified by the most basic equilibrium concept.
The source of these contradictory results could be the di↵erent parameters imple-
mented, in terms of payo↵s and horizon, other features of the design, or di↵erences in the
analysis. To address this, we collect all previous studies and analyze the data within a
unified framework. Of the seven previous studies meeting our criteria, we could obtain the
1Examples include Cournot competition, the tragedy of the commons, team production with unob-
servable e↵ort, natural resource extraction, and public good provision, to name a few.
2For example, Selten & Stoecker (1986) interpret their results to be consistent with subjects learning
to do backward induction. They report the endgame e↵ect–the point after which subjects mutually
defect–to move earlier with experience. In contrast, Andreoni & Miller (1993) find that behavior moves
in the opposite direction; namely, they observe that the point of first defection increases with experience.
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data for five of them.3 This analysis confirms the apparent contradictory nature of prior
results with respect to whether behavior moves in the direction suggested by backward
induction. We investigate the topic further with a new experiment.
With respect to the forces that a↵ect initial play (formation of cooperation), and
unraveling (breakdown of cooperation) we document the following. For initial play, the
parameters of the repeated game have a significant impact on initial cooperation levels,
contrary to the prediction of subgame perfection. We confirm that increasing the horizon
increases cooperation, in line with a folk wisdom shared by many researchers on how
the horizon of a supergame a↵ects play. Namely, that as the horizon increases, coopera-
tion rates increase, and this is attributed, in a loose sense, to the di culty of reasoning
backwards through more rounds.4
Our results indicate that the e↵ect of the horizon on cooperation is brought about
via a di↵erent channel. Increasing the horizon, while keeping the stage-game parameters
constant, increases the value of using a conditionally cooperative strategy relative to one
that starts out by defection. The trade-o↵ between cooperation and defection can be
captured by the size of the basin of attraction of always defect (AD), a simple statistic
imported from the literature on infinitely repeated PDs.5 In a regression analysis of
round-one choices in the meta-study, the value of cooperation has significant explanatory
power over and above the length of the horizon. The new experiment addresses this point
directly by comparing two treatments in which the horizon of the repeated game is varied,
but the value of cooperation is kept constant. Round-one cooperation rates remain similar
throughout our experiment between these two treatments.
One key new finding is that in our experiment, and in every prior experiment for which
we have data, subjects always take time to “learn” to use threshold strategies: strategies
that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round before switching to AD. This ob-
servation is a crucial part of understanding why prior experiments suggest contradictory
patterns with respect to backward induction. Once behavior incompatible with threshold
strategies has disappeared, we find consistent evidence in all treatments in our data set
3Although we re-analyze the original raw data, rather than collate the results of previous studies, we
will refer to this part of our analysis as the meta-study for simplicity.
4With folk wisdom, we refer to the common conception that cognitive limitations play an important
role in explaining divergence from equilibrium behavior in games involving unraveling arguments. In the
context of finitely repeated PD, Result 5 of Normann &Wallace (2012) is an example of prior experimental
evidence suggesting a positive correlation between cooperation rates and the horizon. In the context of
speculative asset market bubbles, Moinas & Pouget (2013) show that increasing the number of steps of
iterated reasoning needed to rule out the bubble increases the probability that a bubble will emerge.
We can also point to multiple papers using the level-k model to explain behavior in the centipede game,
which, as we discuss in Section VII and Online Appendix A.1, is closely connected to the finitely repeated
PD (see Kawagoe & Takizawa (2012), Ho & Su (2013), Garcia-Pola et al. (2016)). In a recent paper,
Alaoui & Penta (2016) present a model of endogenous depth of reasoning that can account for how payo↵
structure a↵ects the degree to which unraveling is observed in this class of games.
5The finding that cooperation correlates to the size of the basin of attraction in infinitely repeated PDs
can be found in Dal Bo´ & Fre´chette (2011). See, also, Blonski et al. (2011), who provide an axiomatic
basis for the role of risk dominance in this context.
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that the round of first defection moves earlier with experience. However, early behavior
typically involves multiple switches between cooperation and defection, and, thus, learn-
ing to play threshold strategies results in a decrease in the rate of early defections. The
speed at which each of these two opposing forces happen–which varies with the payo↵s
and the horizon of the game–make the combined e↵ect look as though subjects either
behave in line with learning backward induction or not.
Although these forces imply unraveling of cooperation in the long run, we find that
this process can be very slow. Hence, to complement our results, we estimate a subject-
level learning model, and use the estimates to generate simulations of long-run behavior.
Our simulations suggest that cooperation rates may remain non-negligible even after
ample experience in the case of parameter constellations conducive to high levels of initial
cooperation.6 The estimation of this learning model also allows us to see the evolution of
the expected value of various strategies. This helps clarify why unraveling is slower in some
treatments than in others. In addition, simulations under counterfactual specifications
reveal that the stage-game parameters, rather than the variation in how subjects “learn”
across treatments, explain variations in the speed of unraveling.
II. Theoretical Considerations and Literature
The PD is a two-person game in which each player simultaneously chooses whether
to cooperate (C) or defect (D), as shown in the left panel of Figure 1(a). If both players
cooperate, they each get a reward payo↵ R that is larger than a punishment payo↵ P ,
which they would get if they were both to defect. A tension results between what is
individually rational and socially optimal when the temptation payo↵ T (defecting when
the other cooperates) is larger than the reward, and the sucker payo↵ S (cooperating
when the other defects) is smaller than the punishment.7
In this case, defecting is the dominant strategy in the stage-game and, by backward
induction, always-defect is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy of the finitely-
repeated game.
[Figure I About Here]
One of the earliest discussions of the PD included a small-scale experiment. Dresher
and Flood conducted that experiment in 1950 using two economists as subjects (reported
in Flood (1952)). That experiment, and others that followed, found positive levels of
cooperation despite the theoretical prediction to the contrary. An early paper to o↵er
an explanation for this phenomenon is due to the gang of four : Kreps et al. (1982)
6Even in these cases, simulation results show a slow but continued decline in cooperation.
7In addition, the payo↵ parameters can be restricted to R > S+T2 > P . The first inequality ensures
that the asymmetric outcome is less e cient than mutual cooperation. The second inequality, which has
been overlooked in the literature but recently emphasized by Friedman & Sinervo (2016), implies that
choosing to cooperate always improves e ciency.
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showed that incomplete information about the type of the other player (either what
strategies they can play or their true payo↵s) can generate cooperation for a certain
number of periods in equilibrium. Alternatively, Radner (1986) proposed the concept of
epsilon-equilibria–in which agents are content to get close to the maximum equilibrium
payo↵s–and showed that cooperation can arise as part of an equilibrium strategy. Other
possibilities that were later explored include learning and limited forward reasoning (see,
for example, Mengel (2014a), Mantovani (2016), and the references therein). Moving
beyond the standard paradigm, social preferences for fairness, altruism or e ciency can
also generate cooperation in this game. Although our meta-analysis and experiment are
not designed to distinguish between these theories, they provide a backdrop for how
cooperation can arise in this environment. Our purpose in this paper is not to test these
theories directly, but, rather, to take a step back and identify the main forces observed in
the data that a↵ect when and how cooperation emerges. We postpone discussion of our
results regarding these theories to the final section.
Much of the early experimental literature on the repeated PD came from psychology.
That literature is too vast to be covered here, but typical examples are Rapoport &
Chammah (1965), Lave (1965), and Morehous (1966). These papers are concerned mainly
with the e↵ect of the horizon, the payo↵s, and the strategies of the opponent. Some of the
methods (for payments, for instance), the specific focus (often horizons in the hundreds
of rounds), and the absence of repetition (supergames are usually played only once) limit
what is of interest to economists in these studies.
Studies on the finitely repeated PD also have a long history in economics.8 Online
Appendix A.1 provides an overview of the papers on the topic.9 More specifically, we
cover all seven published papers (that we could find–five of which are included in our
meta-data) with experiments that include a treatment in which subjects play the finitely
repeated PD and in which this is performed more than once.10,11
8Mengel (2014b) presents a meta-study that covers more papers and also supplements the existing
literature with new experiments. The paper focuses mainly on comparing results from treatments where
subjects change opponents after each play of the stage-game (stranger matching) to results from treat-
ments where subjects play a finitely repeated PD with the same opponent (partner matching). Thus,
the paper is not intended to consider whether behavior moves in the direction of backward induction or
to study the impact of experience more generally. Despite these di↵erences, the main conclusion of that
paper emphasizing the importance of the stage game parameters, and specifically highlighting how the
“risk” and “temptation” parameters can be interpreted to capture the strength of di↵erent forces that
a↵ect cooperation in environments with strategic uncertainty, is consistent with our results.
9Since our interest lies in the emergence and breakdown of cooperation and the role of experience, we
focus only on implementations that include an horizon for the repeated game of two or more rounds and
have at least one re-matching of partners.
10Online Appendix A.1 also discusses several recent papers (Mao et al. (2017); Schneider & Weber
(2013); Kagel & McGee (2016); Cox et al. (2015); Kamei & Putterman (2015)) that study heterogeneity
in cooperative behavior and the role of reputation building in the finitely repeated PD.
11A related game that has been extensively studied in economic experiments is the linear voluntary
contributions mechanism (VCM), often referred to as the public goods game. A two player linear VCM
where each player has two actions corresponds to a special case of the PD. Using the notation defined
in the next section, a binary two players linear VCM is a PD with g = `. However, few experiments
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Overall, these papers give us a fragmented picture of the factors that influence behavior
in the finitely repeated PD. Most papers are designed to study a specific feature of the
repeated game. However, if we try to understand the main forces that characterize the
evolution of behavior, it is di cult to draw general conclusions. For instance, the evidence
is mixed with respect to whether or not subjects defect earlier with experience. There is
evidence consistent with unraveling (experience leading to increased levels of defection by
the end of a repeated game), as well as evidence pointing in the opposite direction (mean
round to first defection shifting to later rounds with experience).
III. The Meta-Study
The meta-study gathers data from five prior experiments on the finitely repeated PD.
Note that we do not rely simply on the results from these studies, but also use their
raw data.12 The analysis includes 340 subjects from 15 sessions with variation in the
stage-game parameters and the horizon of the supergame.
To facilitate the comparison of data from disparate experimental designs and to reduce
the number of parameters that need to be considered, the payo↵s of the stage-game are
normalized so that the reward payo↵ is one and the punishment payo↵ is zero. The
resulting stage-game is shown in the right panel of Figure 1(b), where g = (T   P )/(R 
P )   1 > 0 is the one-shot gain from defecting, compared to the cooperative outcome,
and ` =  (S   P )/(R  P ) > 0 is the one-shot loss from being defected on, compared to
the non-cooperative outcome.
III.A. The Standard Perspective
Prior studies have focused mostly on cooperation rates, often with particular attention
to average cooperation, cooperation in the first round, cooperation in the final round, and
the round of first defection. Thus, we first revisit these data using a uniform methodology
while keeping the focus on these outcome variables–what we refer to as the standard
perspective. Table I reports these statistics for each treatment. They are sorted from
shortest to longest horizon and from largest to smallest gain from defection.
[Table I About Here]
The first observation that stands out from Table I is that, with both inexperienced
and experienced subjects, the horizon length (H) and gain from defection (g) organize
some of the variation observed in cooperation rates. Cooperation rates increase with the
involve repetitions of finitely repeated linear VCMs (with rematching between each supergame); these
are Andreoni & Petrie (2004, 2008), Muller et al. (2008), and Lugovskyy et al. (2017).
12Online Appendix A.2 provides more details on the included studies: henceforth, Andreoni & Miller
(1993) will be identified as AM1993, Cooper, DeJong, Fosythe & Ross (1996) as CDFR1996, Dal Bo´
(2005) as DB2005, Bereby-Meyer & Roth (2006) as BMR2006, and Friedman & Oprea (2012) as FO2012.
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length of the horizon, and decrease with the gain.13 In this sense, there seems to be some
consistency across studies.
Focusing on factors that interact with experience to a↵ect play, the horizon of the
repeated game appears to play an important role. Note that the average cooperation rate
always increases with experience when the horizon is long (H > 8) and always decreases
with experience when it is short (H < 8). Similarly, the mean round to first defection
statistic decreases with experience only if the horizon is very short (H  4).
Other aspects of behavior that previous studies have focused on are round-one and last-
round cooperation rates. The horizon of the repeated game and the gain from defection
appear to play a role in how these measures evolve with experience. Figure II traces the
evolution of these cooperation rates over supergames separated by horizon and payo↵s.
In most treatments, last-round cooperation rates are close to zero or reach low levels
quickly.14 The evolution of round-one cooperation rates depends on the horizon. With
H = 2, cooperation rates in round one are close to zero, and when H = 4, they are
low and decreasing, though at a negligible rate when the gain from defection is small.
The round-one cooperation rate moves in the opposite direction as soon as the horizon
increases further. With both H = 8 and H = 10, round-one cooperation increases with
experience.
[Figure II About Here]
III.B. The Value of Cooperation and Round-One Choices
One consistent result to emerge from the standard perspective is that average co-
operation and round to first defection increase with the horizon. Both observations
are consistent with subjects having di culty–or believing that their partners are having
di culty–making more than a small number of steps of backward induction. However,
if the stage-game is kept constant, increasing the horizon also increases the di↵erence in
the value of joint cooperation versus joint defection. Cooperation becomes more valuable
since more rounds generate the higher payo↵s from joint cooperation. On the other hand,
the risk associated with being defected on does not change: when using a conditionally
13Statistical significance of the patterns reported here are documented in Online Appendix A.2. Tests
reported in the text are based on probits (for binary variables) or linear (for continuous variables) random
e↵ects (subject level) regressions clustered at the paper level for the meta-analysis and the session level
for the new experiment. Exceptions are cases in which tests are performed on specific supergames, where
there are no random e↵ects. Clustering is used as a precaution against paper or session specific factors
that could introduce un-modelled correlations (see Fre´chette 2012, for a discussion of session-e↵ects).
Two alternative specifications are explored to gauge the robustness of the results in Appendix A.4. The
di↵erent specifications do not change the main findings.
14The decline in cooperation in the last round could be due to multiple factors. If cooperation is
driven by reciprocity, the decline could be associated with more pessimistic expectations about others’
cooperativeness in the last round. Alternatively, if cooperation is strategic, the decline could be associated
with the absence of any future interaction with the same partner. Reuben & Seutens (2012) and Cabral
et al. (2014) use experimental designs to disentangle these two forces and find cooperation to be driven
mainly by strategic motives.
7
cooperative strategy, there is, at most, one round in which a player can su↵er the sucker
payo↵, irrespective of the length of the horizon. Hence, the value increases but the risk
does not.
Experiments on the infinitely repeated PD suggest that subjects react to changes in
the stage-game payo↵s and the discount factor according to how they a↵ect the value
of cooperation. However, it is not the case that the value of cooperation, as captured
by cooperation being subgame perfect, predicts on its own whether or not cooperation
emerges. The decision to cooperate seems to be better predicted by the size of the basin
of attraction of always defecting–henceforth sizeBAD–against the grim trigger strategy
(Dal Bo´ & Fre´chette (2011)).15 Hence, the strategic tension is simplified by focusing
on only two extreme strategies: grim trigger and AD. Assuming that these are the only
strategies considered, sizeBAD is the probability that a player must assign to the other
player playing grim so that he is indi↵erent between playing grim and AD.
This measure can be adapted for the finitely repeated PD and used to capture the
value-risk trade-o↵ of cooperation. In this case, it can be calculated directly as:16
sizeBAD =
`
(H   1) + `  g .
Values close to one suggest that the environment is not conducive to supporting (non-
equilibrium) cooperation since a very high belief in one’s partner being conditionally
cooperative is required. The opposite is true if the value is close to zero. As can be seen,
sizeBAD is increasing in g and `, but decreasing in H.
[Table II About Here]
Table II reports the results of a correlated random e↵ects probit investigating the
correlation between round-one choices and design parameters such as the sizeBAD, stage-
game payo↵s, and the horizon.17 The first specification controls for the normalized stage-
game parameters, g and `, and H.18 As can be seen, both g and H have a significant e↵ect
on round-one choices, and in the predicted direction: when there is more to be gained
from defecting if the other cooperates and when the horizon is short, it is less likely that
15The grim trigger strategy first cooperates and cooperates as long as both players have always coop-
erated; and defects otherwise.
16In the finitely repeated PD, AD (Grim) results in a payo↵ of 0 ( `) against a player following AD or a
payo↵ of 1+ g (H) against a player following Grim. sizeBAD corresponds to the probability, p, assigned
to the other player playing Grim that equalizes the expected payo↵ associated with either strategy, given
by pH   (1  p)` = p(1+ g). Unlike in infinitely repeated games, this calculation is not the best-response
to such a population: defecting in the last round would always achieve a higher payo↵.
17Note that although there is variation in sizeBAD, it is highly correlated with the horizon in these
treatments (see Online Appendix A.2).
18We report this specification, as it makes the e↵ect of the regressors of interest easy to read. However,
a more complete specification would interact supergames with dummies, not only for each H, but also
for all g, `, and H. Those results are presented in Online Appendix A.2, but interpreting the e↵ect of a
change in the regressors of interest is complicated by the complex interactions with supergames.
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a subject will make a cooperative round-one choice. The second specification includes
the sizeBAD statistic. The new variable–which is a non-linear combination of g, `, and
H–has a significant negative impact on cooperation, as would be expected if the value
of cooperation considerations outlined above were important. Furthermore, the e↵ect of
the design parameters seems to be accounted for, in large part, by the sizeBAD variable,
with ` and g having a smaller magnitude.19
In summary, by combining data sets from prior studies, we are able to investigate the
impact of stage-game and horizon parameters on cooperation, as well as the interaction
of these with experience. However, a clear understanding of behavior is still not possible
using the meta-analysis alone. First, since the majority of experiments do not vary pa-
rameters within their designs, much of the variation comes from comparing across studies,
where many other implementation details vary. Second, the payo↵ parameters are, for
the most part, constrained to a small region, resulting in a high correlation between the
size of the basin of attraction of AD and the length of the supergame. Finally, very few
of the studies give substantial experience to subjects.
IV. The Experiment
To address the issues identified in the meta-study, we designed and implemented an
experiment that separates the horizon from other confounding factors, systematically
varying the underlying parameters within a unified implementation. In addition, the new
sessions include many more repetitions of the supergame than are commonly found in
prior studies. The experiment is a between-subjects design with two sets of stage-game
payo↵s and two horizons for the repeated game: a 2⇥ 2 factorial design.
The first treatment variables are the stage-game payo↵s. In the experiment, partic-
ipants play one of two possible stage-games that di↵er in their temptation and sucker
payo↵s, as shown in Figure III.20 The payo↵s when both players cooperate or both play-
ers defect are the same in both stage-games. As a consequence, the e ciency gain from
cooperating is the same in both sets of parameters: 31%.
[Figure III About Here]
The first stage-game is referred to as the di cult PD, since the temptation payo↵ is
relatively high and the sucker payo↵ low, while the second stage-game is referred to as
the easy PD, for the opposite reason. In terms of the normalized payo↵s described in
Section III, the (g, `) combination is (2.5, 2.83) for the di cult PD and (1, 1.42) for the
easy PD. As shown in Online Appendix A.2, the easy parameter combination is close to
19Another way to assess to what extent sizeBAD captures the relevant variation is to compare a
measure of fit between specification (1), which does not include sizeBAD, and an alternative specification
that does include sizeBAD, but excludes g, `, and Horizon. To give a sense of this, we estimate these
two specifications using random e↵ects regressions and report the R2. It is 0.34 without sizeBAD and
0.35 with sizeBAD but without g, `, and Horizon.
20Payo↵s are in experimental currency units (ECU) converted to Dollars at the end of the experiment.
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the normalized parameter combinations of a cluster of prior experiments from the meta-
analysis. The di cult parameter combination has larger values of both g and ` than has
been typically implemented.
The second treatment variable is the horizon of the repeated game. To systematically
vary the number of steps of reasoning required for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
prediction, we implement short-horizon and long-horizon repeated games for each stage-
game. In the shorter horizon, the stage-game is repeated four times and in the longer
horizon, eigth times. Combining the two treatment variables gives the four treatments:
D4, D8, E4 and E8, where D/E refer to the stage-game, and 4/8 to the horizon.21
Following the intuition that cooperation is less likely in the di cult stage-game, and
that the unraveling of cooperation is less likely with a longer horizon, cooperation is
expected to be higher as one moves to an easier stage-game and/or to a longer horizon.
However, the comparison between D8 and E4 is crucial, as it mixes the di cult stage-
game parameters with the longer horizon and vice-versa. Indeed, the parameters have
been designed such that this mix gives precisely the same sizeBAD in both treatments.
Hence, if a longer horizon increases cooperation beyond its impact through the changes
in the value of cooperation captured by sizeBAD–possibly because there are more steps
of iterated reasoning to be performed–treatment D8 should generate more round-one
cooperation than treatment E4.22.
IV.A. Procedures
The experiments were conducted at NYU’s Center for Experimental Social Science
using undergraduate students from all majors, recruited via e-mail.23 The procedures for
each session were as follows: after the instruction period, subjects were randomly matched
into pairs for the length of a repeated game (supergame). In each round of a supergame,
subjects played the same stage-game. The length of a supergame was finite and given
in the instructions so that it was known to all subjects. After each round, subjects had
access to their complete history of play up to that point in the session. Pairs were then
randomly rematched between supergames.
A session consisted of 20 or 30 supergames and lasted, on average, an hour and a
half.24 At the end of a session, participants were paid according to the total amount of
ECUs they earned during the session. Subjects earned between $12.29 and $34.70. Three
21The parameters were selected such that, based on the meta-study, we could expect that in the short
run, the aggregate statistics would move in the direction of backward induction, at least for D4, and in
the opposite direction, at least for E8. Other considerations were that the two values of H did not result
in sessions that would be dramatically di↵erent in terms of time spent in the laboratory.
22Other indexes to correlate with cooperation in the finitely repeated PD have been considered, but
they only depend on stage-game payo↵s (Murnighan & Roth (1983), Mengel (2014b))
23Instructions were read aloud (see Online Appendix A.6). The computer interface was implemented
using zTree (Fischbacher (2007)).
24The first session for each treatment consisted of 20 supergames. After running these, it was deter-
mined that the long-horizon sessions were conducted quickly enough to increase the number of supergames
for all treatments. Consequently, the second and third sessions had 30 supergames. The exchange rate
was also adjusted: 0.0045 $/ECU in the first session and 0.003 $/ECU in the second and third sessions.
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sessions were conducted for each treatment.25 Throughout, a subject experienced just
one set of treatment parameters: the stage-game payo↵s and the supergame horizon.
IV.B. The Standard Perspective in the Experiment
Table III provides a summary of the aggregate cooperation rates across treatments. For
each treatment, the data are split into two subsamples: supergames 1-15 and supergames
16-30. Four measures of cooperation are listed: the cooperation rate over all rounds, in
the first round and in the last round, as well as the mean round to first defection. The
first observation is that our treatments generate many of the key features observed across
the di↵erent studies of the meta-analysis. This can be seen most clearly with respect
to first-round cooperation and mean round to first defection. First-round cooperation
in the long-horizon treatments is significantly higher in later than in earlier supergames.
Although none of the di↵erences are significant, the mean round to first defection shows
the same pattern as initial cooperation.
[Table III About Here]
For the average over all rounds, cooperation is lower during the later supergames and
significantly so for the easy stage-game. This observation is in contrast to some of the
studies in our meta-data that find that the average cooperation rate increases with expe-
rience. However, subjects played 30 supergames in our experiment, which is substantially
more than in any of the studies in our meta-data. To provide a more complete compari-
son with the studies from the meta-analysis, Table IV reports the cooperation rate at the
supergames corresponding to the length of the various studies in our meta-data, as well as
in our first and last supergame. For E8, there is a clear increase in cooperation rates early
on, followed by a decline. Indeed, the parameters used in this treatment are the closest
to the studies in which aggregate cooperation is found to be increasing with experience–
namely, those with a longer horizon. The non-monotonicity observed in this treatment,
with respect to the evolution of aggregate cooperation rates with experience, suggests
that experimental design choices, such as the number of repetitions of the supergame in
a session, can significantly alter the type of conclusions drawn from the data.
[Table IV About Here]
Figure IV provides some insight into the underlying forces generating the di↵erences
in the aggregate results documented above. The figure shows the rate of cooperation in
each round, averaged over the first five supergames, supergames 13 to 17 and the last
five supergames. In the long-horizon treatments, especially in E8, cooperation in early
rounds increases with experience. The line associated with the first five supergames lies
below the one associated with the last five for early rounds. This pattern contrasts with
the short-horizon sessions in which the first-five average is at least as large as the last-five
25More details about each session are provided in Online Appendix A.3.
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average. For later rounds, in all treatments, cooperation in the last five supergames is
lower than in the first five. With a short horizon, cooperation rates fall quickly after the
first round. When the horizon is long, this decline does not happen until later, coming
after six rounds in early supergames and after four or five rounds in later supergames.26
[Figure IV About Here]
IV.C. Determinants of Initial Cooperation
Figure V shows, for each treatment, the round-one cooperation rate by supergame.
The treatments generate very di↵erent dynamics with respect to how initial cooperation
evolves with experience, again emphasizing how critical the parameters of the stage-
game and the horizon can be in determining the evolution of play. The D4 treatment
shows decreasing initial cooperation rates, whereas the E8 treatment shows a notable
increase over supergames. The cooperation rates for D8 and E4 look very similar. Neither
treatment suggests a trend over supergames, and cooperation rates stay within the 40-
60% range for the most part. In fact, round-one cooperation rates are not statistically
di↵erent across the two treatments. Moreover, cooperation rates in supergames one and
30 are statistically indistinguishable between the two treatments.27
Remember that in our experiment, the horizon and the stage-game payo↵s were chosen
so that the sizeBAD for E4 and D8 are identical. The equivalence of initial cooperation
rates between the two treatments suggests that, from the perspective of the first round,
the horizon of the repeated game has an e↵ect on cooperation mainly through its impact
on the value of cooperation. An important implication of this is that our findings run
counter to the folk wisdom described earlier, which attributes higher cooperation rates
in longer horizons to the di culty of having to think through more steps of backward
induction.
[Figure V About Here]
V. The Breakdown of Cooperation
Since the E8 treatment provides the starkest contrast to the backward induction pre-
diction, we first provide a more detailed description of behavior in this treatment. We
then apply the key findings from this section to the other treatments and to the other
studies in our meta-analysis in the following section.
26Online Appendix A.3 includes pairwise comparisons of the cooperation measures by treatment.
27In addition to being true for all supergames pooled together, this is true for most supergames taken
individually, except for a few outliers. E4 is higher in supergames 12 and 14 (at the 10% and 5% level,
respectively) and D8 is higher in supergames 18, 19, and 21 (at the 10%, 5%, and 5% level, respectively).
Pooling across supergames from the first and second half of a session separately, cooperation rates are
not significantly di↵erent between E4 and D8 (see Online Appendices A.3 and A.4 for details).
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V.A. Behavior in the E8 treatment
Figure VI tracks cooperation rates across supergames, with each line corresponding
to a specific round of the supergame. The selected rounds include the first round and the
final three rounds.28 Looking at the last round, the trend toward defection is clear. The
round before that shows a short-lived increase in cooperation followed by a systematic
decline. Two rounds before the end, the cooperation rate increases more dramatically
and for a longer time, but this is eventually followed by a gradual decline. Cooperation
rates in round one increase for most of the experiment but then stabilize towards the end,
at a high level close to 90%. Hence, confirming the results from prior studies with longer
horizons, cooperation early in a supergame increases with experience, but cooperation
at the end of a supergame decreases with experience. In addition, non-monotonicity in
cooperation rates for intermediate rounds suggests that the decline in cooperation slowly
makes its way back from the last round. On the whole, there is a compelling picture of
the unraveling of cooperation. However, the process is slow, and, even by the thirtieth
supergame, cooperation is not decreasing in the first round.
[Figure VI About Here]
Thus, we have conflicting observations: behavior at the end of a supergame moves
slowly in the direction suggested by backward induction, while cooperation in early rounds
increases with experience. To reconcile the conflict, consider the aggregate measure, mean
round to first defection. This measure is a meaningful statistic to represent the unraveling
of cooperation, primarily because we think of subjects using threshold strategies. That
is, we expect defection by either player to initiate defection from then on. Hence, the
typical description of backward induction in a finitely repeated PD implicitly involves
the use of threshold strategies: (conditionally) cooperative behavior in the beginning of
a supergame that is potentially followed by noncooperative behavior at the end of the
supergame. Indeed, reasoning through the set of such strategies provides a basis for
conceptualizing the process of backward induction.
A threshold m strategy is formally defined as a strategy that defects first in round m,
conditional on sustained cooperation until then; defection by either player in any round
triggers defection from then on. Consequently, this family of strategies can be thought
of as a mixture of Grim Trigger (Grim) and AD. They start out as Grim and switch to
AD at some predetermined round m. The family of threshold strategies includes AD, by
setting m = 1. It also includes strategies that always (conditionally) cooperate, as we
allow for the round of first defection, m, to be higher than the horizon of the supergame.
Thus, it is possible to observe joint cooperation in all rounds of a supergame if a subject
following a threshold strategy with m > horizon faces another subject who follows a
similar strategy. However, any cooperative play in a round after the first defection in the
supergame, regardless of who was the defector, is inconsistent with a threshold strategy.
28Online Appendix A.3 replicates Figure VI, including all rounds.
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Threshold strategies also have the property that a best response to a threshold strategy
is also a threshold strategy.29
If subjects use threshold strategies, then it would be equivalent to measure cooperation
using the mean round to first defection or the mean round to last cooperation, as threshold
strategies never cooperate after a defection.30 These di↵erent statistics are presented in
the same graph in the left panel of Figure VII. Two key observations are immediately
apparent. First, the two lines are very di↵erent to start with but slowly converge. Second,
mean round to last cooperation is decreasing with experience while mean round to first
defection is increasing (at least in the early parts of a session).
[Figure VII About Here]
If, instead of mean round to first defection, one considers mean round to last coopera-
tion, then it appears as if subjects move in the direction suggested by backward induction
in all treatments, including E8. The gap between the two lines suggests that the use of
threshold strategies becomes dominant over the course of the experiment. This suggestion
is confirmed in the right panel of Figure VII, which shows the fraction of choice sequences
perfectly consistent with the use of a threshold strategy.
Hence, aggregate measures such as the average cooperation rate and mean round to
first defection confound multiple forces. Subjects learning to play threshold strategies
can increase their cooperation at the beginning of a supergame, even if the strategy they
are learning is not more cooperative. To illustrate this e↵ect, consider a subject who,
on average, over the course of a session, plays a threshold strategy that (conditionally)
cooperates for the first four rounds and defects from round five onwards (m = 5). However,
the probability that the subject implements the strategy correctly is only 0.6 in early
supergames, whereas it is 1 in later supergames. If we assume that the distribution of
strategies used by the other subjects remains constant, and a su cient share of them play
cooperative strategies, mean round to first defection will increase with experience for the
subject learning to use this threshold strategy. This is because the subject will sometimes
defect before round five in early supergames, even in the absence of any defection by her
partner, but never in later supergames. This type of learning behavior would also lead
to increasing cooperation rates in round one. In addition, it would generate a decreasing
round to last cooperation over supergames.31
29Threshold strategies are potentially di↵erent from conditionally cooperative strategies which other
studies of repeated social dilemmas have focussed on. Threshold strategies are by definition conditionally
cooperative only up to the threshold round (except if m > horizon). Always defect is not a conditionally
cooperative strategy, but is a special case of the threshold strategies (where m = 1).
30More precisely, for a subject using a threshold strategy, the last round of cooperation is the round
before the first defection, regardless of the opponent’s strategy. Hence, when we directly compare the
mean round to first defection and the mean round to last cooperation, we add one to the latter.
31Burton-Chellew et al. (2016) make a related observation in the context of a public goods game. By
comparing how subjects play against other subjects vs. computers, they show that cooperative behavior
often attributed to social preferences in such contexts are better explained as misunderstandings in how
to maximize income.
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For subjects who have settled on threshold strategies, it is possible to identify two
additional forces, each pulling in the opposite direction. If a subject believes that his
partner is likely to defect starting in round five, then he would want to start defecting at
round four. This is captured by the fact that a best response to a threshold m strategy
is a threshold m   1 strategy. This reasoning is exactly the building block for the logic
of backward induction and leads to lower cooperation rates, a decrease in the round to
first defection among subjects using threshold strategies, and a decrease in the last round
of cooperation. However, even if every subject uses threshold strategies, if there is het-
erogeneity in thresholds to start with, some subjects may realize over time that enough
of their partners use higher thresholds than they do and, thus, may want to defect later.
Such adjustments would lead to increases in some of the cooperation measures. Conse-
quently, the overall e↵ect on cooperation is ambiguous. These considerations highlight the
problems arising from restricting attention to these aggregate measures. They confound
the learning taking place on di↵erent levels: learning to use threshold strategies, updating
beliefs about the strategies of others, and best responding to the population.
Figure VIII provides further evidence for this interpretation. The graph on the left
compares the evolution of mean round to first defection for the whole sample to that of
the subset of pairs that jointly cooperate in Round 1. As expected, the line conditional
on Round 1 cooperation is higher, but the gap between the two lines shrinks as round
1 cooperation rates increase over time. Most importantly, conditional on achieving co-
operation in the first round, mean round to first defection actually decreases over time.
The graph on the right demonstrates this in another way, by plotting the distribution
of the first defection round for the first, the second and the last ten supergames. If the
breakdown of cooperation is defined as the first defection for a pair, then cooperation is
most likely to break down at the beginning or towards the end of the supergame. With
experience, the probability of breakdown at the beginning of a supergame decreases, but
conditional on surviving the first round, cooperation starts to break down earlier. The
shift is slow but clearly visible. The modal defection point (conditional on being higher
than 1) shifts earlier by one round for every ten supergames.
[Figure VIII About Here]
V.B. Breakdown of Cooperation in Other Treatments
Figure IX illustrates, for the three other treatments, the evolution of cooperation for
the first and last three rounds. D8 has a similar increase in initial cooperation with
experience, as noted for E8, but it is less pronounced. Initial rates of cooperation are
below 60% for nearly all supergames and are mostly comparable to those observed in E4.
The lowest rates of initial cooperation are, as expected, in the D4 treatment. The rate
drops quickly from a starting point similar to the other treatments to a rate of about
20%, where it remains for the majority of the supergames.
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For all treatments (including E8), cooperation in the last round is infrequent, espe-
cially after the first ten supergames. We observe a similar pattern for cooperation in the
penultimate round, although for the easy stage-games, cooperation either starts much
higher or takes more supergames to start decreasing. The treatments display more im-
portant di↵erences in behavior for the third from last round. Here, cooperation rates drop
consistently below the 20% mark in the di cult stage-game treatments and take longer to
start decreasing in the long-horizon treatments. Cooperation in this round drops quickly
to very low levels in D4, hovers around the 20% mark in E4, and starts higher in D8 be-
fore dropping below 20%. Overall, this confirms the tendency of decreasing cooperation
rates to start from the last round and gradually shift to earlier rounds. However, this also
highlights that this process can be slow, as cooperation rates in round one decrease over
the 30 supergames in only one of the four treatments.
[Figure IX About Here]
Figure X confirms the observations that not everyone plays threshold strategies at the
start of the experiment and that the use of threshold strategies grows with experience. In
the D8 treatment, the gap between round to first defection and last round of cooperation
+ 1 is originally comparable in size to what is observed in the E8 treatment. With
experience, the two become closer. However, by the end, they are still not identical. For
the treatments with the short horizon, the gap is small to start with and even smaller
by the end. Note that with a shorter horizon, there are fewer possible deviations from
a threshold strategy. Moreover, with a longer horizon, there is more incentive to restore
cooperation after a defection is observed.32 These suggest that convergence to threshold
strategies would happen faster in shorter horizon games.
[Figure X About Here]
What about experiments in the meta? Are there also indications of unraveling in these
once behavior is considered in a less aggregated form? To investigate this, we replicate
Figures VII and VIII in Online Appendix A.2 for the the two experiments that allowed
subjects to play a substantial number of supergames: AM1993 and BMR2006. Both
experiments show patterns consistent with our experimental results. Cooperation in the
last round quickly decreases, whereas cooperation rates in earlier rounds first increase.
The increase is followed by a decrease once the next round’s cooperation rate is low
enough. In both studies, there is a steady increase in round-one cooperation that does
not reach the point where it starts decreasing.
Perhaps the most striking regularity to emerge across all the papers in the meta-study
and our own experiment is the universal increase in the use of threshold strategies when we
32Indeed, H is negatively correlated with play consistent with a threshold strategy in the first su-
pergame. This does not reach statistical significance if only considering our experiment (p = 0.11) but it
is significant at the 1% level when considering the entire meta-data.
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compare the beginning of an experiment to the end (see Table V). In the first supergame
of all studies with H   8, less than 50% of play is consistent with a threshold strategy.
However, this number is higher than 75% in all but one treatment by the last supergame
(in many, it is more than 85%). Even in experiments with H = 4, which already begin
with 68% play of threshold strategies, they are more popular at the end. This suggests
a non-negligible amount of experimentation or confusion at the beginning of a session,
followed by a universal convergence to using threshold strategies.33
[Table V About Here]
VI. Long-run Behavior
The results of the last sections are highly suggestive that unraveling is at work in all
treatments. However, for some treatment parameters, the process is slow enough that it
would take too long for cooperation to reach close to zero levels in a reasonable amount
of time (for subjects to be in a laboratory). Hence, we now estimate a learning model
that will allow us to consider what would happen with even more experience. Using
estimates obtained individually for each subject, we can simulate behavior for many more
supergames than can be observed during a typical lab session. This can help us gain
insight into whether the unraveling would eventually move back to round one or whether
it would stop short of going all the way. It can also give us a sense of the speed at
which this might happen, as well as providing structural estimates for a counterfactual
analysis and an exploration of the expected payo↵s of di↵erent strategies conditional on
the distribution of play.
VI.A. Model
The general structure of the learning model we adopt is motivated by the following
observations documented in the previous sections: (1) cooperation rates in the first round
of a supergame are decreasing in the size of the basin of attraction of AD; (2) choices
respond to experiences with other players in previous supergames; and (3) a majority of
subjects converge to using thresholds strategies. These observations suggest that subjects
are influenced by their beliefs over the type of strategy their partners are following (point 2
above), and by the implied value of cooperation given these beliefs, which is also a function
of the stage-game payo↵s and the supergame horizon (point 1 above). We specify a simple
belief-based learning model that can capture these key features.34
33Statistical significance is established in the regressions reported in Online Appendix A.2.
34This is similar to the recent use of learning models to investigate the evolution of behavior in dy-
namic games. Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011) do this in the context of indefinitely repeated games ex-
periments; Bigoni et al. (2015) use a learning model to better understand the evolution of play in their
continuous-time experiments. In both cases, however, the problem is substantially simplified by the
fact that strategies take extreme forms–immediate and sustained defection or conditional cooperation
(sustained or partial). In the first paper, restricting attention to initial behavior is su cient to identify
strategies; in the second paper, initial and final behavior are su cient to discriminate among the strate-
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Each subject is assumed to start the first supergame with a prior over the type of
strategies her partner uses. The set of strategies considered in the learning model consists
of all threshold-type strategies along with TFT and Suspicious Tit-for-Tat (STFT).35
Note that, contrary to the threshold strategies, TFT and STFT allow for cooperation to
re-emerge after a period of defection within a supergame. We have included all strategies
for which there is evidence of systematic use in the data.36
Beliefs evolve over time, given a subject’s experience within a supergame. After every
supergame, a subject updates her beliefs as follows:
 it+1 = ✓i it + Lit (1)
where  kit can be interpreted as the weight that subject i puts on strategy k to be adopted
by his opponent in supergame t.37 ✓i denotes how the subject discounts past beliefs (✓i = 0
gives Cournot dynamics; ✓i = 1 fictitious play), and Lit is the update vector given play
in supergame t. Lkit takes value 1 when there is a unique strategy that is most consistent
with the opponent’s play within a supergame; for all other strategies, the update vector
takes value 0. When there are multiple strategies that are equally consistent with the
observed play, threshold strategies take precedence, but there is uniform updating among
those.38
Given these beliefs, each subject is modeled as a random utility maximizer. Thus, the
expected utility associated with each strategy can be denoted as a vector:
~µit = ~uit +  i~✏it (2)
~uit = ~U it, where ~U is a square matrix representing the payo↵ associated with playing
each strategy against every other strategy. Note that ~U is a function of the horizon of
the repeated game, as well as of the stage-game payo↵s. The parameter  i is a scaling
gies considered. This will not be possible here, and, hence, estimating a learning model poses a greater
challenge. The approach described here is closest to that of Dal Bo´ & Fre´chette (2011). The model is in
the style of Cheung & Friedman (1997). The reader interested in belief-based learning models is referred
to Fudenberg (1998). There are many other popular learning models: some important ones are found in
Crawford (1995), Roth & Erev (1995), Cooper et al. (1997), and Camerer & Ho (1999).
35The set of threshold strategies includes a threshold strategy that cooperates in every round if the
other subject cooperates (threshold is set to horizon +1), as well as AD (threshold is set to 1). TFT
and STFT replicate the other player’s choice in the previous round; TFT starts by cooperating, whereas
STFT starts by defecting.
36Cooperating all the time, irrespective of the other’s choice, is not included in the strategy set because
there is no indication in the data that subjects follow such a strategy. More specifically, even the most
cooperative subject in our dataset defected at least 34 times throughout the session, and at least 15 times
in the last ten supergames.
37Note that the sum of the components of  it need not sum to 1. This sum can be interpreted as the
strength of the priors: with ✓i it captures the importance of new experiences.
38The tie-breaking rule, which favors threshold strategies in the belief updating, eliminates the possi-
bility of emergence of cooperation via TFT-type strategies in an environment in which all subjects have
settled on threshold strategies, as observed towards the end of the sessions in our data.
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parameter that measures how well each subject best-responds to her beliefs, and ✏it is
a vector of idiosyncratic error terms. Given standard distributional assumptions on the
error terms, this gives rise to the usual logistic form. In other words, the probability of
choosing a strategy k can be written as:
pkit =
exp(u
k
it
 i
)P
k exp(
ukit
 i
)
(3)
The structure of the learning model that we adopt is typical. What is unusual in
our case is that, on this level, it describes choices over strategies rather than actions. It
captures the dynamics of updating beliefs across supergames about the strategies adopted
by others in the population and, consequently, describes learning about the optimality of
di↵erent strategies.
Not all behavior within a supergame is perfectly consistent with subjects following one
of the strategies that we consider. Allowing for other behavior is important to describing
the evolution, but it comes at the cost of more parameters to estimate. Given that our data
suggest that threshold strategies become dominant over time, we follow a parsimonious
approach, and instead of expanding the set of strategies considered, we augment the
standard model by introducing an implementation error.
The implementation error introduces noise into how strategies are translated into ac-
tions within a supergame. In every round, there is some probability that the choice
recommended by a strategy is incorrectly implemented. As the results have shown, in
some treatments, all choices quickly become consistent with threshold strategies, while in
others, the choices inconsistent with threshold strategies disappear more slowly. To ac-
count for this, the implementation error is specified as  it =  t
i
i , where t is the supergame
number and 0   it  0.5. Such a specification allows for extremely rapid decreases in
implementation error (high ) as well as constant implementation error ( = 0). Specifi-
cally, given her strategy choice and the history of play within a supergame,  it represents
the probability that subject i will choose the action that is inconsistent with her strategy
in a given round.39
In summary, for each subject, we estimate  i0,  i,  i, which describe initial beliefs,
noise in strategy and action choice implementation, and ✓i, i, which describe how beliefs
are updated with experience and how execution noise changes over time.40 The estimates
are obtained via maximum likelihood estimation for each subject separately.41 We provide
39The implementation noise a↵ects play within a supergame in two possible ways. The first is the
direct e↵ect; in every round, it creates a potential discrepancy between intended choice and actual choice.
The second is the indirect e↵ect; it changes the history of play for future rounds.
40When H = 4, this represents 11 parameters for 120 observations (30 supergames of four rounds),
and when H = 8, it is 15 parameters for 240 observations (30 supergames of 8 rounds). Except in the
two sessions of 20 supergames, where there are 80 and 160 choices per subject for the short and long
horizons, respectively.
41An alternative would be to pool the data. However, for the purpose of this paper and given the number
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summary statistics of the estimates in Online Appendix A.5.
It is important to clarify that the model allows for a great range of behavior. Neither
convergence to threshold strategies, nor unraveling of cooperation is structurally imposed,
although both are potential outcomes under certain sets of parameters.
VI.B. Simulations
We first use individual-level estimates in conducting simulations to determine if the
learning model captures the main qualitative features of the data. Then, we use the
simulations with more repeated games to understand how cooperation would evolve in
the long run.42 These simulations consist of 100,000 sessions by treatment.43
The learning model fits the data well in terms of capturing the di↵erences between
the treatments with respect to aggregate cooperation rates, mean round to first defection,
and evolution of behavior within a session in all treatments. This is illustrated for the
E8 treatment in Figure XI, which compares the average simulated cooperation rate for
each round of the repeated game with the experimental results.44 The simulation results
capture the key qualitative features of behavior observed in the data remarkably well. In
particular, cooperation rates are clearly increasing in the early rounds of a supergame,
while decreasing in later rounds, as observed in the data. For rounds in the middle, such
as rounds 5 and 6, there is non-monotonicity in cooperation rates, as they first increase
and later decrease. Note that these features are recovered in a model in which there are no
round- or supergame-specific variables, and updating occurs over beliefs about strategies
only between supergames.
[Figure XI About Here]
Figure XI also provides insights into the way cooperation would evolve in the long run.
The supergame (number of repeated games) axis is displayed in log scale to facilitate the
comparison between evolution of behavior in the short term versus the long term. We
observe that in this treatment, which is most conducive to cooperation, there is still
cooperation after 1000 supergames. However, this is clearly limited to early rounds.
More importantly, cooperation rates, if they are still positive, continue declining in all
of observations per subject, obtaining subject-specific estimates is useful and reasonable. Fre´chette (2009)
discusses issues and solutions related to pooling data across subjects in estimating learning models.
42For the simulations, subjects who show limited variation in choice within a session are selected out,
and their actions are simulated directly. Specifically, any subject who cooperates for at most two rounds
throughout the whole session is labeled an AD-type, and is assumed to continue to play the same action,
irrespective of the choices of the subjects she is paired with in future supergames. None of the subjects
identified as AD types cooperates in any round of the last ten supergames. This identification gives us
3/5/11/17 subjects to be AD types in treatments E8/D8/E4/D4, respectively.
43The composition of each session is obtained by randomly drawing (with replacement) 14 subjects (and
their estimated parameters) from the pool of subjects who participated in the corresponding treatment.
44Online Appendix A.5 replicates this analysis for other treatments and also includes detailed figures
focusing only on the first 30 supergames.
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rounds, even after 1000 supergames.45 The evolution suggests that there is unraveling of
cooperation in all rounds, but that it is so slow that cooperation rates for the first round
of a supergame can remain above 80% even after significant experience.46 In contrast,
we show in Online Appendix A.5 that cooperation rates in all other treatments quickly
decline to levels below 10% with little experience.
VI.C. Counterfactuals
In the remainder of this section, we investigate which factors contribute to the sus-
tained cooperation predicted by the learning model for long run behavior in E8. To do
so, we take advantage of the structure of the learning model and study how cooperation
evolves in the long-run under di↵erent counterfactual specifications.
The Kreps et al. (1982) model shows that sustained cooperation until almost the
last round can be a best response to a small fraction of cooperative subjects from a
rational agent who understands backward induction. Since our estimations for the learning
model are at the subject level, we can directly investigate if there is, indeed, significant
heterogeneity in cooperative behavior in the population and whether or not this a↵ects
the unraveling of cooperation. In Online Appendix A.5, we compare cooperation rates in
simulations where all subjects are included to those where the most cooperative subjects
are removed from the sample. The comparative statics suggest that the existence of
cooperative types can slow down unraveling, but the e↵ect seems to be limited.
[Figure XII About Here]
Next, to explore the extent to which stage-game payo↵s–through their e↵ect on strat-
egy choice and, consequently, evolution of beliefs–can explain why unraveling is faster
in the D8 treatment relative to the E8 treatment, we conduct the following counterfac-
tual simulations: We take the individual-level estimates for the learning model from the
E8 treatment and simulate how these subjects would play the D8 stage-game. This ex-
ercise enables us to keep the learning dynamics (priors, updating rule, strategy choice,
and implementation error) constant while varying only the stage-game parameters. In
Figure XII, this is plotted as CF1. The comparison of E8 and CF1 provides a striking
depiction of the importance of the stage-game parameters in the evolution of behavior.
The gap between the two lines for the first supergame demonstrates the impact of the
stage-game parameters on strategy choice when beliefs are kept constant. The gap widens
with experience as subjects interact with each other and update their beliefs about oth-
ers, such that cooperation quickly reaches levels below 10% in less than 50 supergames in
45Regressing cooperation on supergame using the last 50 supergames of the simulations by round reveals
a negative coe cient for all rounds. The negative coe cient is significant in all rounds except round 4,
5, and 8 where cooperation levels are 20%, 9% and 1% by the 1000th supergame.
46While there is evidence of a slow but continued decline in cooperation within the span of our simu-
lations, it does not rule out the possibility that unraveling eventually stagnates at non-zero cooperation
levels with further experience.
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CF1.47
Estimates from the learning model can also be used to investigate the optimality of
strategy choice among subjects. In Online Appendix A.5, we plot the expected payo↵
associated with each strategy and the frequency with which this strategy is chosen for
each treatment. This exercise reveals that expected payo↵s are relatively flat in E8. For
example, we see that in the first supergame, the optimal strategy is using Threshold 7 or
8, while in the last supergame of the session, it is Threshold 5 or 6. For the frequency of
choice, TFT is the most popular strategy early on in the session, but it is replaced by late
threshold strategies by the end of the session. In both cases, some of the most popular
strategies are suboptimal, but the expected loss associated with using them is small. In
comparison, expected payo↵s and frequency of choice associated with the strategies are
quite di↵erent in D8. AD (Threshold 1) is the optimal strategy at both the beginning and
the end of the session. While TFT and STFT are common choices in the first supergame,
AD is the most frequent by the last. This provides further evidence for why unraveling is
slow in this treatment.
Overall, we see that the speed of unraveling is closely connected to how conducive
stage-game parameters are to cooperation, closely mirroring our results on the size of the
basin of attraction of AD as a determinant of initial cooperation.
VII. Discussion
Despite the wealth of experimental research on the finitely repeated PD, prior evi-
dence provides a limited understanding of the factors that contribute to the emergence of
cooperation and its possible unraveling with experience.
In this paper, to understand how cooperative behavior and its evolution with experi-
ence vary with the environment in this canonical game, we re-analyze the data from prior
experimental studies and supplement these results with a new experiment. In doing so,
we are able to reconcile many of the contradictory results in the prior literature, which,
we argue, are driven by two behavioral regularities: the role of the value of cooperation
and the emergence of threshold strategies.
Our paper makes several further contributions to the literature. First, we show that
the parameters of the supergame–the horizon in particular–have a significant impact on
initial cooperation. Our analysis reveals that a longer horizon increases initial cooperation
because it increases the value of using conditionally cooperative strategies, which can be
captured by a simple statistic: the size of the basin of attraction of the Always Defect
strategy. This value-of-cooperation result relates to recent studies on continuous-time
PD games (Friedman & Oprea (2012); Bigoni et al. (2015); Calford & Oprea (2017)).
Friedman & Oprea (2012) conclude that the unraveling argument of backward induction
47We can also study the opposite counterfactual (as plotted in Online Appendix A.5). That is, we can
keep the E8 stage-game parameters constant, but use learning estimates for the subjects who participated
in the D8 treatment. Limited unraveling of cooperation with this counterfactual further highlight that
this behavior is driven by stage-game parameters rather than treatment specific learning dynamics.
22
loses its force when players can react quickly. Treatment di↵erences in our experiment
are driven by similar forces. The decision to cooperate depends on how the temptation
to become the first defector compares to the potential loss from defecting too early. The
size of the basin of attraction captures this trade-o↵ precisely and, in doing so, highlights
the role of strategic uncertainty in determining cooperative behavior. The predictive
power of the size of the basin of attraction can also be understood from an evolution-
ary game theory perspective. The size of the basin of attraction can be interpreted to
capture the robustness of Always Defect as an evolutionary stable strategy in a finitely
repeated prisoners dilemma.48 It has been argued that, while defection should dominate
in short-horizon finitely repeated PD games, as the horizon increases, the emergence of
conditionally cooperative strategies should become more likely (for instance, see Fuden-
berg & Imhof (2008); Imhof et al. (2005)). This is highly intuitive. The presence of a small
share of conditionally cooperative players can make it worthwhile to initiate cooperative
play, especially in long-horizon games conducive to cooperation. This also fits nicely with
our results on long-term dynamics using the learning model. Noise in strategy choice
or implementation of actions can be interpreted as stochastic invasions by alternative
strategies that consequently slow down, or even could possibly prevent, the unraveling of
cooperation (as we observe in the E8 treatment).
Second, the paper identifies a crucial regularity–namely, that threshold strategies al-
ways emerge over time. That is, in every study of the finitely repeated PD in which the
game is played more than once, threshold strategies are substantially more common by
the end of the experiment. While the role of threshold strategies has been noted in the
previous literature (for instance theoretically in Radner (1986) and recently empirically
investigated in Friedman & Oprea (2012)), we find convergence to using threshold strate-
gies to be a critical and systematic feature of the evolution of behavior in this game.
Hence, we identify the interaction of two opposing forces–learning to cooperate in early
rounds by convergence to using threshold strategies and learning to defect in later rounds
due to the unraveling argument of backward induction–to be fundamental in explain-
ing the variation across papers and treatments in the evolution of behavior. This result
also highlights an essential di↵erence between the finitely repeated PD and the centipede
game, which, by construction, constrains players to conditionally cooperative threshold
strategies. While both games have been extensively used to study backward induction,
our results suggest that, (at least) short-term dynamics in these games are governed by
potentially di↵erent forces.
Finally, although our study is not explicitly designed to test alternative theories that
predict cooperation in the finitely repeated PD, we can relate our results to these theo-
ries. Analysis using the learning model indicates that there is some heterogeneity across
subjects in terms of responsiveness to past experiences and willingness to follow coopera-
48It is linked to the size of the invasion (share of the population following the alternative strategy)
needed to take over Always Defect.
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tive strategies. This observation suggests that the reputation-building forces identified in
the model of Kreps et al. (1982) may play a role in generating cooperation and slowing
down the unraveling of cooperation in the finitely repeated PD. Although, in contrast to
the static nature of the Kreps et al. (1982) model, the behavior we observe suggests that
beliefs change significantly across supergames in response to past experiences.49 On the
other hand, as discussed earlier, the value-of-cooperation result supports the approximate
best-responses approach of the epsilon-equilibrium model in Radner (1986), as suggested
by Friedman & Oprea (2012). Di↵erences in cooperative behavior across our treatments
appear to be driven primarily by the corresponding di↵erences in the trade-o↵ between
initiating cooperation versus defection when there is uncertainty about the strategy fol-
lowed by one’s opponent. While our analysis suggests that the unraveling of cooperation
is still happening towards the end in all of our treatments, especially in environments
with potentially high returns to cooperation, we cannot rule out that cooperation would
stabilize at positive levels with further experience. In such treatments where unraveling
is particularly slow, we estimate that a portion of the population follows more coopera-
tive strategies than the optimal best-response to the population, but the relative cost of
adopting these strategies is quite small.
University of Sussex
New York University
University of California Santa Barbara
49Note that we do not see any evidence of subjects following unconditionally cooperative strategies.
This confines the space of behavioral types that can be meaningfully considered in this setting.
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Tables
Table I
Cooperation Rates and Mean Round to First Defection
Cooperation Rate (%) Mean Round to
Average Round 1 Last Round First Defection
Experiment H g ` 1 L 1 L 1 L 1 L
DB2005 2 1.17 0.83 14 13 18 14 10 11 1.21 1.20
within 2 0.83 1.17 25 9 32 13 17 5 1.42 1.14
subject 4 1.17 0.83 33 20 44 32 25 8 1.99 1.58
4 0.83 1.17 31 22 37 34 20 12 1.76 1.61
FO2012 8 4.00 4.00 33 33 43 67 23 3 2.27 3.53
within 8 2.00 4.00 38 34 43 63 30 3 2.77 3.67
subject 8 1.33 0.67 40 48 43 73 37 3 2.83 4.43
8 0.67 0.67 44 69 50 87 30 23 3.10 6.07
BMR2006 10 2.33 2.33 38 66 61 93 22 7 3.19 7.39
AM1993 10 1.67 1.33 17 47 36 86 14 0 1.50 5.50
CDFR1996 10 0.44 0.78 52 57 60 67 20 27 4.63 5.53
Notes. First defection is set to Horizon + 1 if there is no defection. 1: First Supergame; L: Last Supergame.
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Table II
Marginal E↵ects of Correlated Random E↵ects Probit Regression of the Probability of
Cooperating in Round One
(1) (2)
g  0.04⇤⇤⇤ (0.009)  0.03⇤⇤⇤ (0.006)
`  0.02⇤⇤⇤ (0.005) 0.00 (0.005)
Horizon 0.03⇤⇤⇤ (0.004) 0.01 (0.005)
sizeBAD  0.24⇤⇤⇤ (0.025)
Observations 5398 5398
Notes. Standard errors clustered (at the study level) in parentheses. ⇤⇤⇤1%, ⇤⇤5%, ⇤10% significance. Additional controls
include experience variables (supergame interacted with Horizon dummies) and choice history variables (whether the player
cooperated in the first supergame and whether the player they were matched with cooperated in round one of the last
supergame). Complete results reported in Online Appendix A.2.
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Table III
Cooperation Rates: Early Supergames (1–15) vs Late Supergames (16–30)
All rounds Round 1 Last Round First defect
Treatment 1–15 16–30 1–15 16–30 1–15 16–30 1–15 16–30
D4 15.4 >⇤⇤ 9.0 29.1 > 19.5 4.1 >⇤⇤ 3.2 1.5 > 1.3
D8 34.6 > 33.2 49.3 <⇤⇤⇤ 57.1 7.9 >⇤⇤⇤ 4.0 2.8 < 3.1
E4 28.0 >⇤⇤⇤ 21.2 49.0 > 45.2 10.4 >⇤⇤⇤ 3.8 1.9 >⇤⇤ 1.7
E8 60.1 >⇤⇤⇤ 55.2 79.7 <⇤⇤⇤ 88.2 9.0 >⇤⇤⇤ 3.0 5.3 ⇠ 5.3
All 37.8 >⇤⇤⇤ 33.5 51.1 < 51.6 8.0 >⇤⇤⇤ 3.6 2.8 > 2.7
Notes. Significance reported using subject random e↵ects and clustered (session level) standard errors. ⇤⇤⇤1%, ⇤⇤5%, ⇤10%.
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Table IV
Cooperation Rate for All Rounds in Supergames 1, 2, 8, 20 and 30
Supergame
Treatment 1 2 8 20 30
D4 31.5 21.0⇤⇤⇤ 12.5⇤⇤⇤ 11.5⇤⇤⇤ 6.6⇤⇤⇤
D8 36.3 36.3 36.8 35.6 32.6⇤⇤
E4 28.2 29.8 30.2 19.4 20.0⇤
E8 47.6 53.8⇤⇤ 61.4⇤⇤⇤ 51.4 51.6
Notes. Statistical test is for di↵erence from Supergame 1. For E8, decline from Supergame 8 to 30 is significant at the 1%
level. Significance reported using subject random e↵ects and clustered (session level) standard errors. ⇤⇤⇤1%, ⇤⇤5%, ⇤10%.
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Table V
Consistency of Play with Threshold Strategies
Play Consistent With
Threshold Strategy
Experiment Horizon g ` First Supergame Last Supergame
DB2005 2 1.17 0.83 – –
2 0.83 1.17 – –
4 1.17 0.83 0.68 0.80
4 0.83 1.17 0.68 0.78
FO2012 8 4.00 4.00 0.43 0.90
8 2.00 4.00 0.43 0.90
8 1.33 0.67 0.37 0.77
8 0.67 0.67 0.47 0.87
BMR2006 10 2.33 2.33 0.42 0.81
AM1993 10 1.67 1.33 0.29 0.79
CDFR1996 10 0.44 0.78 0.30 0.50
Meta All . . . 0.52 0.79
EFY (D4) 4 3.00 2.83 0.66 0.94
EFY (D8) 8 3.00 2.83 0.50 0.65
EFY (E4) 4 1.00 1.42 0.66 0.94
EFY (E8) 8 1.00 1.42 0.57 0.89
EFY All . . . 0.60 0.85
Notes. Supergame refers to supergame within a set of payo↵ and horizon parameters.
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Figure I
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
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Figure II
Cooperation Rates: Round One (Circles) and Last Round (Triangles)
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Figure III
Stage-Games in the Experiment
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Figure IV
Cooperation Rate by Round Separated in Groups of Five Supergames
36
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
5 10 15 20 25 30 5 10 15 20 25 30
Difficult Easy
4 Rounds 8 Rounds
Av
er
ag
e 
In
itia
l C
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
Ra
te
Supergame
Figure V
Average Cooperation Rates in the First Round
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Figure VI
Mean Cooperation Rate by Round
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Figure VII
Evolution of Threshold Strategies
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Figure VIII
(Left Panel) Mean Round to First Defection: All Pairs Versus Those That Cooperated
in Round One; (Right Panel) Probability of Breakdown in Cooperation
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Figure IX
Cooperation Rates in Selected Rounds Across Supergames
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Evolution of First Defection Versus Last Cooperation Across Supergames
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Figure XI
Average Cooperation: Simulation Versus Experimental Data for Each Round In E8
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Figure XII
Long Term Evolution of Aggregate Cooperation
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